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HMCS Prince Robert:
The Career of an Ar:med
Merchant Cruiser
C.R. Shelley
Introduction

The Genesis of Canada's AMCs

H

MCS Prince Robert was one of three identical
ships used as armed merchant cruisers
(AMCs) by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during
the Second World War. On the eve of war, Canada
had but six modern destroyers, with no prospect
of additional ships for some time. To fill the
desperate need for escorts, the Naval Service
clutched at Prince Robert and her two sister liners
as an expedient in a time of crisis; yet, by war's
end she would be one of the most sophisticated
ships of the RCN. Much like the citizen sailors
who manned her, she signed up for the duration,
saw service worldwide, and returned to civilian
life much changed by the experience of war.

MCS Prince Robert was classed as an armed
merchant cruiser (AMC). An AMC is simply
a fast liner that is requisitioned and armed by
the government in wartime for naval service,
manned by a naval crew. Its usual duties are to
patrol trade routes, convoy merchant ships, and
intercept warships that may be engaged in
commerce-raiding against friendly shipping. The
conversion of liners to AMCs frees regular
cruisers to support fleet actions and to patrol the
more dangerous shipping lanes, in that order of
priority. An AMC is a cheap way of rapidly
increasing the number of surface units available
to the navy as escorts.

The career of the Prince Robert shows quite
effectively the changing roles of the AMC during
the Second World War and the vital niche that
these ships filled. This account of the Prince
Robert has three main objects: to detail the
genesis of the AMC in its Canadian context; to
explain the roles and missions that AMCs were
expected to fulfil; and, to show how the Prince
Robert, as an example of her class, fulfllled them.
Further, the story of the Prince Robert's war
service, in Canadian waters and abroad, sheds
light on the policies of the Naval Service, how the
RCN handled the technical challenges of the
widening war, and how it cooperated with allied
navies. For the Prince Robert was unique among
RCN ships: after her initial conversion, she was
radically refitted twice; her mission changed
totally in the middle of the war; and, she was the
most travelled of any RCN vessel. If for no other
reason, these facts make her noteworthy.

Long before Canada had a navy the Admiralty
saw her as a possible source of AMCs. At the First
Colonial Conference, 4 April to 9 May 1887, Sir
Sandford Fleming, eager to promote the strategic
value of the new Canadian Pacific Railway, offered
that, "any fast mail steamers which the Canadian
Pacific might in future operate across the Pacific
would be available for use as armed merchant
cruisers in time of war." 1 At the 1909 Imperial
Conference, L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and
Fisheries, proposed the conversion of merchant
ships to AMCs as an expedient for local defence.
The Admiralty rejected the idea, possibly in the
hope that Canada would create a real navy.
However, in 1911, Sir William White, a former
Director of Naval Construction for the Admiralty,
(1885-1902) made an unofficial visit to the Prime
Minister, Sir Robert Borden. He discussed naval
policy with Borden and suggested that Canada
could contribute to the common defence by
subsidizing suitable large mail steamers of speeds

H

47
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 5

HMCS Prince Robert. in the Georgia Strait, shortly after her 1943 refit.

greater than 18 knots for use as AMCs during a
war. Subsidization would permit the government
to approve the plans before the ships were built,
to allow for the incorporation of a stiffened
structure for mounting the guns. These ships
would protect Canadian commerce and trade
routes while the Royal Navy husbanded cruisers
for the inevitable large fleet actions with Germany. 2
The scheme resembled today's American Civil
Reserve Air Fleet, which subsidizes a number of
civilian jumbo-jets with large cargo-loading doors
and stiff floors that can accommodate outsize
military cargo in times of need.
Although Borden seems to have been warm
to the idea, and even mentioned it in a cable to
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill,
on 22 March 1913, the endeavour collapsed with
the failure of the Naval Aid Bill in the Senate. 3
Nonetheless, the Admiralty did arm three
Canadian Pacific liners, the Empress of Asia, the
Empress of Japan, and the Empress of Russia
as AMCs during the Great War. 4

(NAC PA 147131)

Not surprisingly, the issue of AMCs surfaced
again during the interwar period. Commerce
raiders, such as the German cruiser Emden, had
met with some success during the Great War, and
the Admiralty assumed that such a threat would
recur in any future conflict. In 1927 the Admiralty
requested the Under Secretary of State for the
Dominions to gain Canada's agreement for the
pre-positioning of guns and other stores in
Canada sufficient to arm four AMCs on the west
coast. Their proposed employment was "to
prevent American contraband trade with Japan,"
in the event of a war between the Empire and
Japan. 5 Similar proposals were made to Australia
and New Zealand. Pre-positioning would give the
Dominions the capability to press AMCs into
service long before a similarly converted ship,
dispatched from Britain, could arrive on station. 6
Canada accepted the proposal, which cost very
little, (storage only) and over a ten year period
the Admiralty laid down the appropriate arms
and equipment. 7
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By 1932 the Canadian government began to
give some slight attention to the Naval Service,
and to the War Book, wherein some "suitable
government and privately owned vessels were
earmarked as auxiliaries," should the need arise. 8
As the decade progressed, and the war clouds
loomed darkly on the horizon, the government
considered the question of Canada's naval defence
more seriously. In 1935, the Chief of the Naval
Staff, Commodore Percy Nelles, assessed the
naval threat to Canada for the Minister for Naval
Services. Nelles foresaw possible raids on
shipping by enemy AMCs, submarines, or
possibly light cruisers, and he proposed a
minimum force of six modem destroyers as a
defence. 9 However, the idea of converting
Canadian ships into AMCs for the RCN, was not
far from his mind.

The Prince Robert as an AMC
he ships that had caught the eye of the Naval
T
Service were three ordered in 1929 by
Canadian National Steamships from the Cammell
Laird shipyards, Birkenhead, Scotland. CN
named them Prince Robert, Prince David, and
Prince Henry, not after royalty, but as a
counterpoint to Canadian Pacific's Princess fleet.
Purchased at a cost of over $2,000,000 dollars
in 1930, the Prince Robert was a small liner of
6,893 tons gross displacement, 385 feet in length.
She was capable of 23 knots, but at a more sedate
15 knots she had an endurance of 6, 000 miles.
Her three decks made her a fairly high ship, and
her cargo spaces, car storage and staircases
meant that she lacked the watertight integrity
desirable in a ship of war. Nonetheless, she and
her two sisters were the most suitable Canadian
registered ships available for conversion to
AMCs. 10 Nelles moved twice, in 1937 and again
in 1938, to prevent their sale to foreign shipping
interests in order to keep them in Canada. 11 Nelles
also ensured that the War Book provided for
gaining the authority from the Privy Council to
requisition such ships. 12
When the Second World War broke out, the
Admiralty asked the Naval Service to arm certain
British registered liners as AMCs, using the stocks
deposited in Canada during the 1930s. Work
commenced 3 September 1939 on SS Letitia at
Montreal, and on the P & 0 liner Rajputana at

Esquimalt. The conversion was rapid, with HMS
Letitia sailing on 25 November, and HMS
Rajputana sailing on 29 December. 13 In all, the

Admiralty requisitioned 51 liners as AMCs,
representing 773,000 tons of the fmest passenger
shipping in the British Empire. 14 All, save one,
were large ships, in the 11,000 to 22,000 ton
range. 15 Conversion was straightforward.
Shipyards removed as much inflammable
material as possible, and installed ballast, 6-inch
guns, and a rudimentary fire-control system.
However, the result was a high-sided, fast rolling
gun-platform, from which accurate gunfire was
very difficult. 16 As the master of the liner SS
Transylvania remarked after she was taken into
RN service, "[a) merchantman must always be an
indifferent fighting ship, however gallant the men
who man her. "17
Canadian plans for the Prince ships were
more ambitious than a simple modification. The
naval staffs plans called for removing the liners'
top three decks, fitting a light cruiser
superstructure, and mounting four 6-inch guns
along the ships' centre-line. 18 As Canada owned
neither the guns nor the equipment for the
conversion, Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ)
signalled the Admiralty proposing to draw guns
from pre-positioned stocks. 19 The Admiralty
agreed to the conversion of the ships in short
order. 20 By 3 September 1939, an Order-inCouncil gave the Naval Service the authority to
requisition ships, and on the 19th, the War
Appropriations Act approved $10,000,000 for the
first shipbuilding programme. 21 At first the Naval
Service had wanted to charter the ships, but as
the scale of the modifications required became
apparent, it decided to buy the ships outright,
and in December 1939 negotiated with CN for
their purchase. The haggling went on for some
time, but finally they agreed upon a price of
$700,000 for the Prince Robert. 22
SS Prince Robert was taken in hand at
Burrard Dry Dock, Vancouver on 9 February
1940. The shipyard ripped apart the luxurious
lounges of the upper decks where King George Vl
and Queen Elizabeth had strolled during their
transit from Victoria to Vancouver the previous
May. In their place came a light cruiser
superstructure, four 6-inch Mk.VII guns on 20
degree mountings, two 3-inch high-angle (HA)
Mk.I anti-aircraft guns, two Lewis guns, and
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four .5-inch machine guns. 23 A rudimentary fire
control system was installed, as was service
accommodation for 22 officers and 219 ratings. 24
The first of the three AMCs fmished, HMCS Prince
Robert was commissioned on 31 July 1940, at a
cost of$755,300. 25
The AMCs, stripped of their civilian finery,
daubed with grey and armed with ancient guns
in odd positions, faced a life that was potentially
quite short. The Admiralty expected German
surface raiders to attack British shipping, using
their 'pocket-battleships' of the Deutchsland
class, cruisers, and disguised armed merchant
raiders. Therefore, the Admiralty sought to
prevent the escape of German surface forces into
the Atlantic by patrolling the exits, and in
particular the northern exits between the Faeroe
Islands and Iceland, and the Denmark strait. 26
The Admiralty manned this "northern patrol" with
AMCs of the Royal Navy, and although these large,
fast liners filled the gap during a time of desperate
need, they paid the price before the guns of the
German navy. Scharnhorst sank HMS
Rawalpindi on 23 November 1939, Admiral
Scheer sank HMS Jervis Bay on 5 November
1940, and U-boats accounted for eight AMCs in
1940 alone. 27 Nor could the cost be measured
solely in terms of ships lost. By official estimate,
the conversion of liners caused Britain to forego
one and a half to two million tons of imports
before the fall of France, and the AMCs had the
potential of transporting 100,000 troops at a time
when troopships were at a premium. 28 Yet, one
can hardly fault the Admiralty for failing to foresee
the fall of France or the need for American troops
to cross the Atlantic. In 1939 I 40 the conversion
of liners to AMCs provided desperately needed
ships to close the gaps in the patrol lines.
The prospect of an armed merchant raider
appearing in the waters off Canada's Pacific coast
concerned the RCN in 1940, and HMCS Prince
Robert was expected to combat this threat. 29
These raiders bore the outward appearance of
merchant ships, but they mounted five modem
5.9-inch guns, torpedo tubes, and a scouting
aircraft, carefully concealed behind painted
canvas screens. 30 They carried sufficient flags and
fake superstructure to mimic up to three or four
neutral ships on the Lloyd's register, allowing
them either to pass as harmless, or else come
within close range of their quarry without being

suspected. They were deadly fighters, for their
modern guns ranged 20,000 yards as against
14,200 yards for anAMC. So it was that the raider
Thor sank the AMC HMS Voltaire on 4 April 1941,
after thrashing HMS Alcantra and HMS
Carnarvon Castle in 1940. 31 Even proper fighting
ships were vulnerable; the cruiser HMAS Sydney
managed to sink the raider Kormoran on 19
November 1941 near Perth, Australia, but was
herself sent to the bottom with the loss of all
hands. 32
In the fall of 1940, HMCS Prince Robert
remained the only RCN ship available to protect
shipping on the west coast. The threat of raiders
occupied her there for almost the next two years.
Fortunately for Canada, and Prince Robert,
German raiders were unlikely to roam as far as
the west coast when there were easier pickings to
be found elsewhere. US President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's order of 5 September 1939, creating
a Neutrality Patrol and a Pan-American Neutrality
Zone in the waters surrounding the United States
and South America, influenced German
deployments. Although raiders did enter the zone
on occasion, they generally stayed clear, on
instructions from Hitler. 33 Thus, Canada's west
coast became an isolated and constricted hunting
ground, and the Germans stayed away.
If raiders posed little threat in the immediate
vicinity of the west coast, their presence in the
Pacific was still problematic. The Admiralty chose
to keep a strict watch on German supply ships in
neutral ports as one means of combatting the
raider threat. These supply ships had taken refuge
in neutral ports at the onset of war. On receipt of
a coded message they would sally out and
rendezvous with a raider. One such ship was the
Weser, sheltering in the Mexican port of
Manzanillo, waiting to re-supply the raider
Orion. 34 In September 1940, the Commander-inChief America and the West Indies requested that
NSHQ sail Prince Robert to patrol offManzanillo
and intercept the Weser. The Commanding Officer
Pacific Coast (COPC) ordered Prince Robert to
sail forthwith.
Since commissioning under pennant number
F56 on the 31st of July, the Prince Robert had
been at Esquimalt, and had barely started her
work-ups. She did one trial shoot with her 6-inch
guns on 11 September, then headed south to
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Mexico in what her captain, Commander C.T.
Beard, RCN, called, "a very unready state. "35 She
was aided by a minor piece of deception: a fake
story planted by Naval Intelligence in the Seattle
edition of the Vancouver Sun stating that Prince
Robert would not be out of refit for some time. A
Nazi agent in Seattle obligingly wired the
information to the captain of the Weser in
Manzanillo. 36 Sure enough, on the night of 25
September the Weser sortied, and due to some
skilful seamanship Prince Robert surprised her
right outside the three mile limit. The Prince
Robert fired but one shot, a starshell, and seized
the freighter so quickly that her crew made no
attempt to scuttle or burn the ship. The Weser's
captain later told Commander Beard that he had
thought Prince Robert was only a Mexican coastguard cutter, and so was taken unawares. It was
a glorious start to Prince Robert's career.
It is just as well that no fighting took place,
for Prince Robert's armament was desperately
inadequate. Nominally, the three Prince ships
were the most powerful units in the RCN.
However, their 6-inch guns were 40 years old,
having been salvaged from the casemates of
scrapped King Edward class battleships, while
the Great War vintage 3-inch HA guns were of little
use against modern aircraft. 37 Problems With the
6-inch armament were common. The guns in "A"
and "B" turrets sometimes failed to run-out after
firing, and in 1941 the captain, Commander Hart,
RCN, complained that "A" gun could not be trained
without the assistance of at least five ratings
pushing against the muzzle. 38 On another
occasion the recoil mechanism on a 3-inch HA
gun failed due to metal fatigue. 39 Unfortunately,
the years of governmental neglect could not be
made up overnight, and as a result more modem
armaments were simply not available in Canada
in 1940-41. So Prince Robert sailed on as she
was, toiling away on west coast escort and patrol.

The remainder of 1940 and the spring of 1941
saw Prince Robert patrolling off the South
American coast on Admiralty orders and Visiting
various neutral ports to keep an eye on the
German shipping bottled by the British blockade.
At the request of the New Zealand Naval Board,
Prince Robert was assigned in the spring of 1941
as an escort for SS Awatea, which was bringing
airmen from Australia and New Zealand to
Canada for the British Commonwealth Air

Training Plan. 40 Prince Robert refitted at
Esquimalt during the summer of 1941, and in
October joined up once again With Awatea to
carry the ill-fated Royal Rifles of Canada and the
Winnipeg Grenadiers to Hong Kong. On the return
trip, Prince Robert cleared Pearl Harbour three
days ahead of the Japanese attack, never
approaching closer than 500 miles to the
Japanese fleet. COPC sent them word of the
calamity at 114 7 hours 7 December 1941. 41
The entry of the Japanese into the war gave
new impetus to the problems of west coast
defence. NSHQ despatched HMCS Prince David
to Esquimalt immediately, and HMCS Prince
Henry followed Within five months. By May 1942,
west coast naval strength stood at three AMCs,
three corvettes, five minesweepers, and three
armed yachts. 42 HMCS Prince Robert entered a
minor refit in February 1942. The addition of
asdic for the detection of submarines, splinter
matting for protecting the bridge, SW1-C radar
for surface warning, and four hand served 20 mm
Oerlikon guns for close-in anti-aircraft defence
brought her complement up to 24 officers and
302 men. 43 With these changes NSHQ considered
her suitable for coastal patrol duties.
NSHQ harboured no illusions about either the
threat or the fighting value of the AMCs. NSHQ
assigned the ships the following tasks:" ... first,
to provide objectives which are vital to our war
effort With efficient close protection; and second,
to provide mobile forces capable of proceeding
with the utmost dispatch to any threatened
point."44 However, another mission statement put
a high value on a visible presence:
1.

2.

To guard focal shipping points in the
Northeast Pacific, particularly off BC.
To patrol sheltered waters where enemy
vessels might hide along the coast.

3.

To reassure the public by their presence in
the absence of any other warships.

4.

To obviate American pressure on sparse
Canadian naval forces in the area.

5.

To make credible publicized threats against
the enemy. 45

The Naval Service hoped that the sight of three
large, impressive looking, Canadian warships in
the Straits of Georgia off Vancouver would calm
the public's fears of a Japanese attack. They could
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do little else. By the end of 1941 the German
surface raiders had shot their bolt and were no
longer a threat. The three Princes, barely adequate
against a raider, certainly had little potential with
their ancient guns against units of the Japanese
Imperial Fleet. Yet, they still fulfilled a useful
political, vice operational role for Canada.

in Esquimalt. They discussed the matter, COPC
suggesting that the Princes and two corvettes
might be offered up, to which the CNS agreed in
principle. Nothing more was heard until the USN
naval liaison officer raised the matter on 15
August; then, on 16 August, the US Commander
North-West Sea Frontier signalled:

Fate, and the eagerness of the COPC,
intervened to fmd Prince Robert more challenging
duties. Japan seized the Aleutian islands ofKiska
and Attu in June 1942, and it did not take the
Americans long to prepare their riposte. Prince
Robert's role in the affair would be both the
occasion for a minor controversy and the catalyst
that brought about her second career. At a June
naval conference in San Francisco, COPC
(Commodore Beech, RCN) had been asked by US
General De Witte if the RCN could provide any
assistance for the upcoming operation against
Kiska. COPC had held out the possibility of antisubmarine patrols, but made no promises, nor
did he inform NSHQ, preferring to wait for the
visit ofthe Chief of the Naval Stafffrom 4-10 July

How many escort and anti-submarine vessels
are you willing to spare for Alaska project?
Desire ships report 20 August at Kodiak .... 46

Due to the short notice, COPC issued sailing
orders immediately, informing NSHQ after the
fact.
Mr. Angus MacDonald, Minister for Naval
Services, informed the Cabinet War Committee
of COPC's actions on 26 August, noting that, " .. .it
was conceived to be part of[COPC's] duty to be
of assistance, where possible, to American
forces. "47 Indeed, this was generally so; however,
Commodore Beech had exceeded the provisions
of the North American defence plan ABC-22.

Canada's first anti-aircrcift ship. at a British naval base. January 1944.

(NAC PA 163947)
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Although it was not discussed at the meeting,
ABC-22, Section IV, Task Four, paragraph 21,
"Defend Alaska and Protect Its Sea
Communications within the Coastal Zone," had
the sub-task in paragraph 25, "Canada, NavyProvide sea transport. Protect sea
communications in the Canadian Coastal Zone. "48
The task COPC had agreed to was clearly beyond
the Canadian Coastal Zone. The Prime Minister
was perturbed, and remarked that, "Commanding
Officers must understand that the Minister
concerned, and ultimately the War Committee,
had final responsibility in matters of this kind. "49
Equally irritating was that NSHQ had experienced
great difficulty in getting any information from
the Americans about their plans or the enemy
forces involved. 50 There was one last telling
comment before the committee passed on to
weightier matters. The Minister for Naval
Services," ... stated that it had been pointed out
on his instructions specifically to the US
commander that the Canadian AMCs were not
regarded as real fighting ships suited for this
duty."51
Whether suitable or not, Prince Robert
proceeded directly to patrol off Kodiak on 17
August. For three months she endured ghastly
weather, fog, and treacherous currents while
escorting convoys from Kodiak to Dutch Harbour.
While Prince Robert was engaged in this
demanding and necessary work, the future of the
three Prince ships was being decided in Ottawa
and London.

HMCS Prince Robert as an Auxiliary
Anti-Aircraft Ship
he day of the armed merchant cruiser in the
Second World War was now over. Escorts
were available in sufficient numbers such that it
was no longer justifiable to risk these large,
valuable ships with their puny armaments on the
open ocean. Of 51 AMCs, by 1943 fifteen had been
sunk, 26 converted back to troopships, and the
remainder retained in other duties. 52 For Canada's
Prince ships, the question of new roles and new
armaments had been a topic of discussion
between the Admiralty and NSHQ. After
considering an Admiralty offer of four slightly
newer Mk.XII 6-inch guns for each vessel, NSHQ
declined, preferring to mount lighter, quick-

T

firing guns. NSHQ chose a configuration of five
twin 4-inch HAlLA mountings capable of eighty
degrees of elevation. The advantages over the
old 6-inch mountings were numerous: greater
range, a heavier broadside due to the higher
rate of fire, and most importantly, the guns were
effective against aircraft. 53
The Admiralty had accepted the idea of
arming escorts with twin 4-inch HA/ LA mountings
with some reluctance. Senior naval officers
favoured the larger 4.7-inch guns which gave
hitting power for surface actions. But at Narvik
German dive bombers had easily beaten the 40
degree mountings of Tribal class destroyers, and
since the fall of France and the extension of
German air cover over the Western Approaches,
aircraft and U -boats had eclipsed surface forces
as threats. 54 The Admiralty's change in armament
doctrine became apparent in HMS Lance, an L
class destroyer completed in 1941 with 4-inch
HA/LA mountings. She proved extremely
successful in both HA and LA roles. 55 Arming
Prince Robert with five twin 4-inch mountings,
suitable secondary armament, and a modem fire
control system would make her an extremely
powerful anti-aircraft escort.
Canada's Naval Board decided on conversion
of the three Princes in September 1942. 56 Its
proposal to arm the ships with five twin 4-inch
mountings, suitable secondary armament, and a
modern fire-control system reflected not only the
ascendancy of the air threat, but the RCN's desire
to find a useful role for the ships. The Admiralty
finally settled the matter in January 1943, by
officially requesting that one Prince ship (Prince
Robert) be re-equipped as an anti-aircraft ship,
and the other two as Landing Ships Infantry
(Medium). 5 7 All would be used under RN control
in Europe.
Prince Robert began her conversion at
Burrard Drydock, Vancouver, in February 1943.
NSHQ chose the west coast dockyard as it was
much less pressed for work and labour than east
coast dockyards, and had better access to
materials. Burrard executed the modifications
specified in the Admiralty plans with
commendable skill, using Canadian workers.
They machined gun platforms for five Mk.XIX HA/
LA mountings, each boasting twin 4-inch Mk.XVI*
guns. It was truly a Canadian production: the
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Pift view of HMCS Prince Robert in 1943. The three twin 4-inch gun mountings
qf the ajt group are clearly visible. (NAC PA 145618)

mountings were made in Trenton, Ontario; the
guns were the first 10 off the line from Sorel
Industries, Sorel. Quebec; and the fuse-setting
machinery was made by Reliance Gear Works in
Vancouver, B.C. Secondary armament consisted
of two 4-barrel, 2-pounder Mk.VII pom-poms, and
six 20 mm hand-operated Oerlikon guns. The
installation of a Rangefmder Director Mk. V, a Fuse
Keeping Clock Mk.III*, a Fire Control Box Mk.II,
a Gyro Roll Corrector Mk.VII, and an Automatic
Barrage Unit Mk.I provided Prince Robert with a
relatively sophisticated fire control system. Radar
information came from a 272 Mk.III Surface
Warning set, a 285 gun-ranging set, and a SW2-C
radar set. The SW2-C was a modified version of
the Canadian SW1-C that incorporated an
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) function capable
of discerning friendly vessels or aircraft from
unfriendly ones. 58 The ship's complement
mushroomed to 33 officers and 405 ratings. 59
With the exception of building Tribal-class
destroyers, the refit of the Prince Robert was

probably the most complex task undertaken by
a Canadian shipyard during the war.
Prince Robert was recommissioned on 7 June
1943 as an auxiliary anti-aircraft ship, and after
work-ups sailed for England, reaching the Clyde
in mid-August. For the next year Prince Robert
was under the operational control of the RN,
employed as an anti-aircraft escort on the UKGibraltar run, and in the Mediterranean. She
added a powerful anti-aircraft defence to any
convoy she escorted, but this power came at a
price. The new armament meant that Prince
Robert was now top heavy, displacing 7, 243 tons,
and riding 3 feet 8 inches below her designed
deep loading marks. Without the water-tight
division of a fighting ship, she was sure to capsize
quickly, if damaged. 60

NSHQ signalled the Admiralty in early August
authorizing them to make any additions or
alterations necessary for fighting efficiency. As a
result, a team from the RN Gunnery School, HMS
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Excellent, inspected the ship. 61 They reported
Prince Robert to be generally well fitted out and

efficient, but made several recommendations
with respect to radar, armament, and fire
control. 62 By no means were all of these
implemented, but the British replaced the
Canadian SW2-C radar with a 291 air warning
unit; they installed two type 242 IFF sets and
an Air Plotting table; and, they installed six
additional Oerlikon guns, giving a total of seven
for each side. Her captain, Captain A.M. Hope,
RCN, considered that, allowing for work-ups,
Prince Robert would be ready for action by 18
October 1943. 63
Prince Robert's time of testing would soon be
upon her. Allied naval and air forces had soundly
defeated the U-boats in the North Atlantic and
the Bay of Biscay during the summer of 1943.
This defeat brought on some belated cooperation
between the Luftwaffe and the U-boats in the Bay
of Biscay during the months of September
through November, as the German Navy
Commander, Admiral Doenitz, sought to regain
the offensive by attacking convoys on the UKGibraltar run. It was these very convoys, passing
through the Bay of Biscay, which Prince Robert
was tasked to defend.

The Luftwaffe threw two new weapons into
the fray, in the form of the Hs293 radio-controlled
glider bomb and the SD1400Xradio-controlled
bomb, better known as the 'Fritz-X'. The former
had a 1,000-pound warhead for use against
merchant ships or unarmoured escorts, while the
latter had a 3,000-pound warhead to pierce the
decks of armoured warships. 64 In May 1943,
Admiral Doenitz had advocated using the new
weapons in a mass-attack on Gibraltar sometime
after June 1943, when sufficient numbers had
been stock-piled. Hitler considered such a move
impractical due to the difficulty in overflying Spain
and security concerns should one fall into Allied
hands. Instead, he ordered the weapons to be
used to make up the shortfall in sinkings by
U-boats. 65 German aircraft could only reach the
Bay of Biscay convoy routes, yet, in what can only
be considered a piece of ineptitude on the part of
the Luftwaffe High Command, the Hs293 was fed
into the battle piecemeal. On 27 August 1943,
the Tribal-class destroyer HMCS Athabaskan
was the first to suffer, when Do-21 7 bombers of
Kampfgeschwader (KG) 100 hit her with an
Hs293 glider bomb. A frigate, HMS Egret, blew

up after being hit by a glider bomb during the
same attack. 66 Despite these successes, the
Luftwaffe was not prepared to follow up its
advantage. The Do-217 was only an interim
carrier for the weapon, and the Luftwaffe awaited
the arrival of the new HE-1 77 bomber before
renewing the aerial offensive. 67 On 25 October
1943, KG 40 arrived in south-west France at
Bordeaux-Merignac, equipped with HE-177 I A5
aircraft capable of carrying the Hs293. 68 The
Prince Robert was soon to meet them in battle.
In mid-November Doenitz threw his forces
into combat against a 66-ship convoy, SL139/
MKS30, that was proceeding from Gibraltar to
England through the Bay of Biscay. On the 16th,
as they sailed about 200 miles southwest of Cape
St. Vincent, under escort by seven ships of the
40th Escort Group, a long-range FW -200
reconnaissance aircraft sighted them. Doenitz laid
three successive patrol lines of U-boats across
their path. By 18 November the battle had been
joined, and the U -boats got the worst of it. For
the next three days, SL139 /MKS30 battled its way
homeward. German losses were high: HMS Exe
sank U -333 on the 18th; a 179 Squadron
Wellington sank U-211 on the 19th; HMS Nene,
HMCS Calgary, and HMCS Snowberry sank
U -536 on the 20th; and HMS Foley and HMS
Crane sank U-538 on the 21st. 69 The British
suffered damage to HMS Exe, which had left one
propeller embedded in the hull of U -333 after
ramming her; the sloop HMS Chanticleer lost her
stern to an acoustic torpedo, but struggled back
to the Azores; and, U-boats shot down two antisubmarine aircraft on the 21st. 70
It had been the Admiralty's practice to have
Prince Robert sail from her base at Plymouth to

escort convoys between England to Gibraltar, and
vice versa. After several uneventful convoys the
Admiralty ordered Prince Robert into Plymouth
on 19 November for repairs to her asdic dome.
After putting much of the crew ashore on leave,
the Captain received an order at 1900 hours from
Western Approaches Command to make ready
to sail immediately in support of SL139 /MKS30.
A mad scramble ensued to both round-up the
crew and repair a leak in number 3 boiler, but by
0400 hours on the 20th Prince Robert had cleared
Portsmouth harbour, southbound for the Bay
of Biscay. 71
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The Luftwaffe struck SL139/MKS30 at
1527 hours, 21 November when 20 HE-177
aircraft of KG 40 attacked with glider bombs. 72
FW-200 aircraft joined in with high level
bombing. The Germans dropped glider bombs
at intervals of 4 to 5 minutes, and at 1558 hours
a glider bomb hit and mortally damaged the
M.V. Marsa. The escorts, reinforced to 22 ships,
engaged the aircraft with gunfire. Prince Robert
arrived as the attack was developing and took
her normal station astern of the convoy,
opening fire immediately. 73 The attackers
released sixteen glider bombs during the battle,
twelve of which seem to have been directed
against the straggler, M.V. Marsa. 74 The Prince
Robert engaged three separate HE-1 77 aircraft
making attacks on the convoy, damaging one,
and preventing it from launching its weapon.
The HE-177s released their weapons at 14,000
yards range and 7,000 feet altitude. Mter the
bomb fell from the aircraft, its rocket motor
ignited, accelerating it to 370 miles per hour.
The rocket cut out after 12 seconds. whereupon
the bomb dove down at a 45 degree angle
towards its target. The operator in the launching
aircraft guided the bomb, placing the bomb and
the target on the aircraft's port side. The bomb
then flew at low level, about 50 feet, as the
operator tried to manoeuvre it into the side of
the ship. With an impact speed of approximately
450 miles per hour and a 1 ,000-pound
warhead, a hit from an Hs293 was deadly. 75
Prince Robert was fortunate in arriving just as
the battle commenced. Had German
reconnaissance planes spotted an anti-aircraft
ship with the convoy, the attackers would
doubtless have concentrated on sinking her as
a first priority. 76 Her timely arrival seems to have
surprised them.
Prince Robert engaged the HE-177 control
planes with her 4-inch armament, firing 333
rounds in all. At one particularly tense moment
a glider bomb headed towards the Prince Robert,
and was engaged by the short-range armament.
Fortunately, it passed close by Prince Robert and
achieved a near-miss on a merchant ship 1,000
yards away on the tail of the convoy's port
column. 77 The Gunnery Officer, LieutenantCommander R.I. Hendy, later recalled that he had
difficulty getting radar ranges for the HE-1 77,
as the radar operator tended to track the gliderbomb instead. 78

The attack ceased at 1705 hours. The
results tallied as follows: one ship badly
damaged and abandoned, one ship damaged
but seaworthy, and one escort damaged; as
against three German aircraft shot-down, (two
by a patrol plane), and three damaged. 79 The
volume and accuracy of the anti-aircraft fire
from Prince Robert and the few frigates of the
escort appears to have disconcerted the
attackers. By the same token, the ability to use
a "stand-off' delivery kept the aircraft casualties
low, considering that only one aircraft was lost
to anti-aircraft fire. Nevertheless, the ships got
through. The escort forces of SLl39/MKS30
won a clear victory over the combined aerial
and U-boat forces of the Reich. As S.W. Roskill
stated in The War At Sea, "[t)he victory of the
sea and air escorts had indeed been resounding,
and the long-awaited co-operation of the
Luftwaffe with the U-boats had not achieved
the results hoped for by Doenitz. "80 When the
Luftwaffe tried again, on 26 November, to attack
another convoy off Bougie, it lost four HE-177s
during the action and another three from forced
landings. Daylight attacks on shipping were
henceforth abandoned. 81
For Prince Robert the duty of escort continued
on, taking her along the convoy routes to
Gibraltar, and into the Mediterranean during
1944. As she went about her uneventful, but
important, routine, plans were being made in
London and Ottawa which would see her refitted
once more, and sailing in yet another theatre of
war, the Pacific. As early as November 1943 the
Admiralty considered refitting Prince Robert as a
Flagship for an Escort Carrier Force to be sent
to the Pacific, but decided against it due to her
lack of armour and the lack of time in which to
effect the necessary radar upgrades. 82
Nonetheless, the expectation that Prince Robert
would be refitted was firmly fixed in the
Admiralty, and once refitted the only logical place
to employ her was the Pacific.

*****
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HMCS Prince Robert: Anti-Aircraft
Cruiser for the Pacific
e-fit.ting the Prince Robert as an anti-aircraft
cru1ser for deployment to the Pacific theatre
required a considerable leap in sophistication for
her fire-control, radar, and communication
systems. The gunnery inspection report of HMS
Excellent and the earlier message from NSHQ
authorizing the Admiralty to make any additions
and alterations necessary for efficiency had
provided the initial shove which had got the idea
of another refit in motion. Ships officers spoke
directly to RN authorities about further changes
to Prince Robert, and the RN assumed on its part
that these conversations were official requests
from the RCN, which they were not. 83 Thus, when
the Admiralty proposed, at a meeting of the
Canadian Joint Staff Mission with the British
Chiefs of Staff in London on 19 May 1944, that
Prince Robert be part of the Canadian
contribution to the Pacific, they did so on the

R

assumption that she would be extensively
refitted. 84 On 11 October 1944 the Cabinet War
Committee decided Prince Robert would go to the
Pacific. 85 The RCN was not opposed to the refit,
but believed that the Admiralty had done all the
staff work. NSHQ discovered, to its chagrin, that
the plans drawn up by the Director of Naval
Construction (RN) at Bath were not Admiralty
approved, and that no Staff Requirements had
been raised for the refit. The Director of Naval
Construction at NSHQ lamented that, "as the
Prince Robert was to all intents and purposes a
RN ship ... " the RN should have raised the Staff
Requirements. 86 He then pointed out the
deficiencies of the Prince Robert with respect to
top weight and lack of watertight division. His
final comment was, "[t]he procedure which has
led to the present conversion shows that divided
control between Admiralty and NSHQ is
unsatisfactory, and that in future the
responsibility for A[dditions] and A[lterations],
etc., for RCN ships under RN administration must

HMCS Prince Robert arrives in Esquimault, B.C. carrying Canadian personnel liberated
from Japanese prisoner-of-war camps, 20 October 1945. (NAC PA 116788)
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remain with NSHQ." 87 DNC's frustrations were
understandable; they stemmed from having to
delay the completion of two Tribal-class
destroyers in order to prepare the paperwork and
drawings for Prince Robert. 88
Administrative difficulties aside, there was an
obvious need for a modem anti-aircraft cruiser if
the RCN was to fight Japan. In September 1944,
Prince Robert returned to Canada, and on 20
December was paid off into refit at the Burrard
Dock in Vancouver. There she was fitted with an
Action Information Office roughly equivalent to
that of a modern destroyer, a combined
Operations and Bridge plotting table, a simplified
Air Directing room for fighter direction, and a host
of new radar equipment. A barrage director and
automatic barrage unit were fitted aft for the
control of the aft 4-inch guns. Perhaps the most
significant omission was that of Remote Power
Control for the main guns, which would have
allowed the director to train the guns remotely. 89
The main armament remained ten 4-inch
Mk.:XVI* guns in twin HA/LA mountings, but
secondary armament changed to two poweroperated quadruple pom-poms, two poweroperated twin 20 millimetre Oerlikons, five single
Oerlikons, and four 40 millimetre power-operated
Boffin guns. All Oerlikon and Boffm guns featured
gyro-stabilized reflector sights, similar to those
employed in fighter aircraft. 90 When
commissioned on 4 June 1945, Prince Robert
was outgunned only by the RCN's new cruisers,
Uganda and Ontario. Unlike the cruisers,
however, Prince Robert was a Canadian effort.
As fate would have it, Prince Robert arrived
in the Pacific too late to see any action against
Japan. Her captain, Captain W.B. Creery, RCN,
represented Canada at the surrender ceremonies
in Hong Kong, and the ship had the ironic task of
transporting former prisoners of war from Hong
Kong back to Canada. Once home, there was no
question of keeping Prince Robert in service. Not
only did she lack the speed to keep up with the
fleet carriers, cruisers and destroyers of the RCN's
post-war dream navy, but the inadequacies of her
merchant hull, with its lack of watertight division,
and her excessive topweight, made it
unconscionable to keep her in service as a fighting
ship. Prince Robert was paid off to War Assets
for disposal on 18 January 1946. 91

Back to Civvy Street

P

rince Robert's conversion into an AMC for the
RCN in 1940 had been in line with sixty years
of naval thought which saw the conversion of fast
liners into armed ships of war as a partial solution
to the problem of Canada's naval defence.
Canada's failure to acquire the guns and
equipment necessary to execute even the modest
plan of converting three ships had put NSHQ in
the embarrassing position of asking permission
of the Admiralty to use the weapons that had been
put aside for British ships. That Prince Robert
never met an armed foe during her duty as an
AMC was fortunate, indeed, for her armament
was obsolete and unsuited to the task of hunting
down and destroying raiders. It was only when
rearmed as an anti-aircraft ship that she took her
rightful place in the fighting line of the RCN.

The carriers, cruisers, and fleet destroyers
of the post-war RCN faded relatively quickly from
the scene, but Prince Robert left a legacy. When
Canada's Tribal-class destroyers refitted in the
1950s, their 4.7-inch mountings were removed,
and in their place were the 4-inch HAlLA guns of
an anti-aircraft ship. Prince Robert served on in
civilian life until 1962, when, as SS Lucania, she
was scrapped by her Italian owners. Like so many
wartime ships, she went unnoticed at the end.
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